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### **A Theoretical Perspective on the American Intervention in Guatemala: 1954**

In this paper I plan to take a look at one intervention in a Latin America country of the United States and to explain this intervention through a theory of international relations. I plan to make an analysis of the events that led to the 1954 CIA backed-up coup against the Guatemalan President of that time Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. This topic has been discussed and re-discussed by many scholars of international relations, especially during the "prime time" of the Latin American politics analysis, in the 60s and 70s. Many documents were released by CIA, in the 90s, that allowed a number of books to be written on this topic revealing what the American public money were paying for. However, none of the pieces written until now on the topic of the Guatemalan coup really tried to analyze the coup from a perspective of international relations theory. The only piece that made an attempt at this is Stephen Streeter's piece, that I often quoted in this paper, however this piece draws a number of conclusions that proved to be wrong when the CIA secret files were opened. In this paper, I shall try to do exactly this. I shall look at the reason for this US intervention in Guatemala and try to find the theory that could explain these reasons. I believe that it is more to this intervention that the simple anti-Communist fear that the United States had during the early 50s. I believe that is more to this than the lobby made by an American company with vested interests in Guatemala. I believe that we are dealing with a prolongation of the Monroe Doctrine in different circumstances and under a different form, and more exactly with the view expressed by Secretary of State Olney in 1895, that has been so much disregarded, but that gives us such a useful inside of what the foreign policy makers in Washington think of the Latin American countries. It is a prolongation of a Doctrine that was built for different purposes at that moment in time, but even though the purposes changed it is still the same framework used. The initial Monroe doctrine was about

securing trade as much as about keeping an European great power (or to be precise, a decaying great power) out of the Western Hemisphere (Spain) as well as the other European great powers. The application of the Monroe Doctrine in the case of Guatemala is thought to be about corporate interests in the form of the United Fruit Company as well as about keeping one European great power, the only other great power in the world besides United States at that time, Communist Soviet Union out of the Western Hemisphere. The research question on which I plan to work in this paper is: Was the intervention in Guatemala caused by the fact that US considered it necessary to defend its economic interests in Latin America and not to let a trend of nationalizations take over American company properties, or was it just a reaction to the fear that the United States had towards the fact that Communism could take root in the Western Hemisphere and thus threaten the United States even more? Of course the basic question is about the theory of international relations that could best explain the American intervention. Is it 19<sup>th</sup> century great power politics offensive realism, just a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine? Is it 20<sup>th</sup> century defensive realism, revisionism, post-revisionism, something else or a combination of all these? These are the questions I will try to answer in this paper and hopefully I will manage to put the flesh of the events on the theoretical skeleton so that they will fit and give us a theory-practice relationship that would explain what happened.

Following the Monroe Doctrine (1823), United States considered Latin America as its backyard. The Monroe Doctrine stated that the US "would regard any interposition by a European power in the affairs of the former colonies [in the Western Hemisphere], which had established their independence and had been recognized by the United States as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States"(Rostow, p.119). It is interesting to mention the fact that this idea that further took the shape of a doctrine, was actually put forward by British Foreign Minister George Canning, in August 1823, when United Kingdom proposed to the United States to make a joint statement that would basically stop any ideas of a race between European powers to take over the newly liberated Spanish colonies of Latin America, among which the territory that is nowadays known as Guatemala. Taking into consideration the high amount of trade that Britain was having with the former Spanish colonies of Latin America, the British Foreign Minister saw the maintenance of the trade advantages as very important for the interests of the United Kingdom in the area and threatened France that it will recognize the independence of the Latin American republics if any attempts would be made to stop or derail UK's trade in the area. United States in its turn, took this proposal, and rephrased it and in December 1823 in a speech in front of the Congress President Monroe, stated it as mentioned above, without

accepting a joint declaration together with the United Kingdom. As you can see from the very beginning the Doctrine aimed at keeping the European powers out and at safeguarding a number of economic interests in the area. After all, this Doctrine would not have survived if the British Navy would not have given it its blessing. Thus it was a tacit agreement between the two Anglo-Saxon powers, each getting what it wanted (US- keeping out the Europeans and UK- trade advantages). Following this Doctrine, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century United States had a number of interventions in Latin America (1846-War with Mexico, acquires half of its territory; 1855-intervention in Nicaragua, 1898-war with Spain, takes over Cuba and Puerto Rico; 1903-encourages Panama secession from Columbia; 1902-forces Haiti to clear up debts with European banks; 1905-financial protectorate over the Dominican Republic; 1912-US Marines invade Nicaragua). The Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted several times. In 1895, when the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute arose, Secretary of State Olney claimed "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition" (quoted in Henry James, p.109). In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt gave the most interventionist interpretation to the Monroe Doctrine, in what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine where he says that "the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power"(Roosevelt Annual message to Congress, 1904). Basically, an understatement from Secretary of State Olney's view, but definitely more than the mere non-intervention of European powers in the Western Hemisphere politics of the Monroe Doctrine. It is important to mention that in the meantime the US developed a huge trade with Latin America and actually controlled most of the trade on the Pacific shores of Central and South America.

Why is all this relevant? It gives us an idea of the theoretical framework of the relationships between the US and Latin American countries. This theoretical framework, represented by the Monroe Doctrine, which is based on a hegemon theory and power politics, 19<sup>th</sup> century realism, could provide an answer for the US intervention in 1954 in Guatemala.

In talking about the 1954 coup I shall look only at the arguments that were used for the intervention and take for granted the fact that it was a CIA backed intervention (the materials to prove that could be found in the National Security Archive, Guatemala Project). Operation PBSUCCESS, the CIA code-name used for the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954, started actually in the early 50s, when there was an increase in the

activities of CIA, formerly Central Intelligence Group, to find information about the leaders of the Guatemalan republic. In 1947 exiled Salvadorian Communists opened a labor school, the Escuela Claridad and managed to get some influent converts, among them Gutierrez and Jose Manuel Fortuny, the founders of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT). FBI gathered files on these two, but these files were of little interest. In 1947, specialists from the Central Intelligence Group come to Guatemala and took over the FBI files, however their status did not change. But in that period of time Guatemala was an open country that made it attractive to the Communists of Central America, that as J.C King, CIA chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, put it: "When a Communist in a Central American country gets into difficulties at home, he can find refuge, a well-paid job and often a public post of major responsibility in Guatemala"(King to Allen Dulles "Background Information on Guatemala" Job 78-01228A, Box 13). The State Department complained over the existence of Communists in high positions but Arevalo, the president of that period did not take any action. A report of the National Security Council is interesting for our debate. It states: "We would have been concerned with any tendency towards excessive nationalism in Guatemala, but we are the more deeply concerned because the Communists have been able to distort this spirit to serve their ends." (Department of State, "Guatemala" 2 May 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951-2: 1415-1426) This report is very interesting because it mentions the fact that US would be concerned with any tendency of excessive nationalism. Why that? There are two explanations: 1.the US wants to protect the American businesses in Guatemala and therefore it does not want a growth of nationalist tendencies that could endanger these businesses (let's not forget that excessive nationalism led to the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951!); 2.US disapproves of any Latin American governments that follows the path of nationalism and does not obey the "dictates" of the US State Department. The latter explanation is a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine, while the first is an important point raised by the revisionist theory.

But the US was even more concerned because of the Communist threat. Actually it was not the US as a whole that was concerned in 1950 with the Communist threat, but some parts of CIA. And here we get on a tricky territory where it is very important to pay attention at the dates. The United Fruit Company was a major US company that developed activities in Guatemala. During President Jorge Ubico's dictatorial rule of Guatemala, UFC enjoyed many advantages in the exchange of bribing the right officials. In 1947 President Arevalo passed a labor code that affected the large companies including UFC, but also including state companies. The United Fruit Company employees struck demanding higher wages and better work conditions. The United Fruit considered that the new labor code

affected it in a discriminatory manner and had no choice but to appeal to the US Embassy, that the State Department placed at the disposal of the UFC on this matter: "If the Guatemalans want to handle a Guatemalan company roughly it is not our business, but if they handle an American company roughly it is our business"(Culather, p.8). However the US Embassy in Guatemala had no more luck than the UFC officials had. Therefore the UFC officials took the game even higher, hiring Edward Berneys, the "father of modern public relations" to lobby the Congress that the attacks on the company were proofs of Communist complicity. Berneys developed a PR attack on Guatemala, sending reporters from Time, Newsweek, New York Times to Guatemala to report on the Communist techniques of the Arevalo government. In the same time, in May 1950, another United Fruit lobbyist, Thomas Corcoran met with Thomas Mann, State Department's head of the Central America office and unsuccessfully tried to convince him that Arbenz would win the next elections, at the end of 1950 and he is a Communist threat for the US interests in the region. However Mann did not buy this argument: "Embassy officials considered him [Arbenz] free of Communist influence" (Culather, p.9). Then Corcoran went to Allen Dulles, the deputy director of CIA, in May 1950 and tried to convince him. Dulles, even though more sympathetic towards this idea, considered at that moment in time that it was the job of the State Department to handle these businesses. However, the Office of Policy Coordination, a bureau officially under the CIA, but reporting to the State Department, grew concerned in August 1950 about the "rapid growth of Communist activity in Guatemala and the probability that Guatemala may become a central point for the dissemination of anti-US propaganda" (Culather, p.10). In the mean time the United Fruit Company supported Castillo Armas, an opposition leader that was living in exile in Mexico with weapons and money.

What do we make of these events? First of all it is worth to mention that we are still with the events in 1950 and Capt. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was not in power yet. Actually he could have been considered at that moment in time, a real democrat, taking into consideration that he and Maj. Francisco Arana led the coup against the dictator Jorge Uribo, and then they organized free and fair elections won by Juan Jose Arevalo. He defended democracy a second time when he opposed the forces of his former ally Major Arana to overthrow the Government of Arevalo, and he got Arana killed. Therefore who could think that this military guy that brought electoral democracy to Guatemala and saved it once could be a Communist? But the Communist label was used with different meanings by US officials: some considered the Communist threat to take root in Guatemala because of what King described as an "open house" for neighboring Communists; some associated

nationalism with the Communist threat, as in the case of the United Fruit Company lobbyists, in order to serve their own corporate interests. So, the label Communists until the election of Arbenz as president in 1950, had been used to describe more or less the entire regime, at least in the view of the United Fruit Co. lobbyists.

In 1950 Arbenz became President of Guatemala. The PGT did not help him much in the election (PGT never did well at the polls and there were only 4 Communists in the 61 members Assembly), but it is worth to mention that Arbenz was a close friend with Gutierrez and Fortuny, the founders of the Marxist-Leninist Party, PGT, for a long period of time. A second point to be made is that even though Arbenz did not have Communists in his Government, Communist oriented officials were running the state radio, newspapers, and also held key positions in the agrarian and social security departments.

In 1951, Arbenz asked Fortuny and Gutierrez to draft a proposal for major restructuring of the land property in Guatemala. This became known as the Decree 900 and it was implemented in 1952. This Decree aimed to disband the major landholders and to give land to all the people. It was an interesting scheme that did not aim at collectivization, but rather at forming a rural peasantry that will not have to work on the lands of the major landlords with poor salaries and in very bad conditions. The US aid officials considered this decree to be "constructive and democratic in its aims, similar to agrarian programs US was supporting in Japan and Formosa (Culather, p.13). Even more, "historians have recently described Decree 900 as a moderate, capitalist reform" (Culather,p. 13). Of course this Decree hit the United Fruit Company, too and not only the local landlords. The UFC had large estates that were taken by the Government and valued at the amount that the UFC kept declaring (about 1mil. \$, even though they valued about 20mil. \$). Of course UFC got mad over this and they demanded that they would be paid 20 mil. \$ and not 1mil.\$, forgetting that they were just fine with that value placed on their land when they were paying lower taxes because of that. This brought in the State Department that until now, except that fact that it tried to help UFC in 1947 through the US Embassy in Guatemala City, did not think that they are dealing with Communists. However, when the link between this land reform and the PGT leaders was made it became clear for the State Department that this reform had a "strong political motivation and significance" (Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p.164; NIE 84 Probable Developments in Guatemala, 19 May 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 4: 1064, 1070). On June 28<sup>th</sup> 1954, due to an intervention from exiled opponents led by Amaras and backed-up by CIA officials, Arbenz resigned and fled to Mexico.

Cutting this history short and analyzing what happened, I would say that we have several approaches. One of them is the realist approach: the US Eisenhower Administration threat of Soviet Communism taking over a country considered to be in the American sphere of influence. Therefore the US intervention in Guatemala happened in order to defend the US interests against the expansionist interests of the Soviet Union Communism. We are talking here about "defensive realism", Kenneth Waltz style, where US intervenes in Guatemala and asserts its power in order to gain security. Notice the language used at that time, that clearly shows a realist approach of the issue: "Arbenz government was a potential threat to US security" that appears in a CIA report (Culather, p.15). It is very important in my opinion to make a difference between Soviet Communism and Guatemalan home-grown Communism. John Peurifoy, US ambassador to Guatemala in 1953, however considered that "Communism is directed by Kremlin all over the world and anyone who thinks differently doesn't know what he is talking about." (House Select Committee on Communist Agression, Communist Agression in Latin America, 83<sup>rd</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> session, 1954, p.125). After the Korean war, every Communist was considered to be an agent of the Soviet Union. There are several questions to be asked here: 1. Were the Communists in Guatemala led by Gutierrez and Fortuny really leading the Arbenz government towards a Communist path or not? 2. Was this portrayal of Guatemalan leaders as communists made by the lobbyists of the United Fruit Company real? 3. Were the Soviet Communists helping the Guatemalan Communists in any way? These are important questions to be answered in order to understand if the fear of Soviet Communism that the US (CIA and State Department and later Pentagon) had towards Guatemala was based on actual facts or on the way the policies of the Guatemalan Government were portrayed by corporate groups of interest (e.g.: United Fruit Company).

But for the realist theory to hold water it is very important to see if the Communists, that CIA and the State Department thought that were leading Guatemala (Arbenz, in this case) were actually Communists. However in order to have a realist theory, the events could prove not to coincide with the perceptions of the CIA and US State Department. But if the events do not coincide with the perceptions of the US institutions mentioned above, then we may look for other explanations. However we should not disregard the realist approach, because the evidence does not coincide with the perception. A realist theory is applied if there is a perception that the requirements for such a theory exist. It does not matter if they really exist or not. It is important to see if they are perceived as existing. However if Arbenz was not a Communist and the Communist threat was not as high as CIA considered it to be, then we could look for other explanations into theories like those of revisionism or post-revisionism, or re-interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine and test these theories keeping in

mind that we could still end up with a realist theory. Because the decision to intervene could be explained by the fact, for example, that Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and his brother Deputy Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles had shares in the United Fruit Company for example, using in this case a revisionist theory. Or that the Communist threat was mistaken for nationalism, in which case we could explain the intervention by the post-revisionist theory. Or that all we are dealing with, is a country that disobeys the master of the Hemisphere, the United States.

After proving why it is important to answer to the three questions raised above I shall answer the questions. So, was the Arbenz government led by the PGT towards a Communist path? The answer to this question has to do with the personal beliefs of Arbenz. As I mentioned above he was a close friend of the Communist leadership, and as his widow and Communist leaders mentioned in interviews with Piero Gleijeses, that Arbenz became more attracted by the ideology of the PGT. However it is interesting to see the time of Communism we are talking about in Guatemala. It is Marxist-Leninism, of the classical Marxist type that believed that Guatemala has to pass through capitalism in order to arrive at socialism, not even at communism (Streeter, p.5). Secondly, the land reform was as I mentioned above, considered even by US aid officials as democratic and similar to what US was doing in Japan. However based again on the accounts of Gleijeses' interviews with PGT leaders, apparently there was a Communist plan to use the Decree 900 to develop Communist grassroots. According to Fortuny, the party believed that by administering Decree 900 through local committees, it would be laying "the groundwork for the eventual radicalization of the peasantry." The PGT elicited the support of Arbenz, who agreed to help "foster the control of the reform from below," and sow "the seeds of a more collective society." (Gleijeses, p. 152). But let's not forget that probably it was not the Communists who would take advantage of this land reform, but rather the Arbenz government and that the Communists did badly in the elections. I doubt however that the PGT could have obtained what they wanted to, knowing the results that this type of land reform brought in other places, like Japan for example. This type of reform was also used with success by United States in Third World countries, that could have fallen in the Communist sphere of influence.

From the first question derives the answer to the second question: No. The portrayal made by the United Fruit Company, considering the leadership (be it in the time of Arevalo or in the time of Arbenz) of Guatemala as Communist was not real. As I mentioned before, the Guatemalan leadership was Communist in UFC's view, because it did not do what a US

company told it to do, therefore they were against US interest and therefore they would be Communists. At the very best, faulty logic, I would say.

The third question is a very delicate one, because on the type of answer/evidence to support this answer that I will give, the whole realism theory stands. I believe that there was no connection between the Soviet Union Communism, actually Stalinism at that moment in time and the PGT Marxism-Leninism. Ronald Schneider searched the Guatemalan governmental documents seized by the CIA in 1954 and did find any funds transferred or correspondence with Moskow. Gleijeses that examined the same documents and conducted interviews with Communist leaders considered that the Communist threats were grossly exaggerated. The Soviets made one contact with the Arbenz government and that was to buy bananas. But the deal fall because the government was unable to transport the bananas without the support of the United Fruit Company. Stephen Streeter from McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada, another researcher on this topic, states that the Guatemalan Communists tried to get the Soviets involved but they did not succeed in doing this (Interpreting the 1954 US intervention in Guatemala, p.6). However he does not bring any evidence for this statement. I, personally, strongly disagree with this belief, because I see no connection between Marxist-Leninists that want to achieve capitalism first and then move to socialism and Stalinist type of Communism.

So, should we dismiss the realist perspective totally? Not yet. It is true that the realist perspective was built on misjudged facts and events, but this is not to say that in 10 years time, when the influence of the PGT could have risen and the ideology of the PGT change, realizing that they do not need a capitalist stage, the Soviet Union could have seized the opportunity and made out of Guatemala what it made out of Cuba, a Communist bastion in the Western Hemisphere. However the facts that the documents reveal do not support this conclusion. But what the facts support is that the belief that there was a Communist threat made things move in the US towards an intervention.

But what if we have a corporate interest that makes the case so appealing to the realists that they act and implement what might seem as a realist policy? What do I mean by this? What if the whole Communist threat thing was a play made by the officials and lobbyists of the United Fruit Company, knowing that they could catch some fish with this play in certain quarters of D.C.'s high foreign politics, make them believe that the whole Guatemalan case is about a real Communist threat, therefore they would use their realist theory, but in fact it is just a big lie meant to help US corporate imperialist goals? Would this still be realism? No.

This would be called revisionism, in international relations theory. I mentioned above the works of Cocoran and Bernays trying to sell the Guatemalan leadership as Communist, when this leadership took decisions that affected United Fruit Company. I also mentioned that they did not catch fish in the State Department but they found a more sympathetic Allen Dulles at the CIA. And from May to August 1950, there was a change of heart inside the CIA, as I mentioned before, in which Guatemalan leadership started to be viewed as Communist leaning. What triggered that change? At that time, we still have Arevalo in power and the PGT is not on the high politics board of Guatemala. One explanation could be the fact that apparently the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, the CIA Deputy Director had shares in the UFC. However, for further analysis it is worth to mention that Allen Dulles did not buy Cocoran's arguments in the first place. "The North American Congress on Latin America, a leftist think tank which served as the leading proponent of the dependency school in the United States, proposed that an "intervention lobby" had managed to prod the Eisenhower administration into deposing Arbenz" (Streeter, p.4). This idea that the whole intervention was about corporate interests was analyzed by an important trend in international relations: the dependency theory in the 60s and 70s. The dependency theory goes hand in hand with the revisionist theory on the argument that US intervened in Latin America in order to safeguard its economic interests. They differ on the reasons: the dependency theorist believe that US never wanted Latin America to develop to a level that would allow it to escape the US influence, while the revisionists believe that the US was so scared of the Communists that they would have intervened anywhere in their sphere of influence if any idea of Communism would have taken root there. Some very important revisionists like William Appleman Williams, Richard J. Barnet, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, for example, "argued that the United States generally opposed democracy in the Third World. In their view, the Open Door policy had led to countless U.S. interventions in underdeveloped regions such as Latin America in order to protect trade, markets, and North American businesses such as the UFCO. " (William Appleman Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1972); Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York, 1968); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York, 1972). Apparently, before launching operation PBSUCCESS, CIA Deputy Director, Allen Dulles promised an UFC official, that any government that would replace Arbenz, would protect the company's interests. (Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, NY, 1982), pp. 106, 120). And so it happened! When Armas took office, he took the lands of the UFC out of the Decree 900. But

in order to have a clearer picture it is worth to mention the declaration of John Foster Dulles: "If the United Fruit matter were settled, if they gave a gold piece for every banana, the problem would remain as it is today as far as the presence of Communist infiltration in Guatemala is concerned." (Transcript of a news conference, 8 June 1954, U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Washington, DC, 1957), vol. 1, p. 1310.)

So, what do we make out of this? It would be easy to think of the moment in 1947 when the State Department put the services of the Embassy in Guatemala at the UFC's disposal and say: probably it happened again, therefore, we have a revisionist "economic empire" theory in place. But, what I cannot understand is why after the fall of Arbenz the Eisenhower administration permitted the Justice Department to proceed with a long delayed antitrust suit against United Fruit that weakened its monopoly and contributed to the company's eventual disintegration? If economic interests dictate politics how could this event be explained? Secondly, it was the CIA that convinced the State Department of the Communist threat in Guatemala and not the UFC. But was the UFC that convinced the CIA of this threat? I would say that CIA was convinced of the Communist threat by the open doors policy of Guatemala for neighboring Communists, and not by the label used by PR and lobby UFC masterminds. Because after all it was not Allen Dulles that made efforts to get the Guatemalans as Communists but a department in the CIA that came up with this (at least based on the evidence that I saw).

Another possible explanation could be the post-revisionist one, that considers that the Eisenhower Administration officials made an often mistake: confusing nationalism and anti-colonialism in third world countries with Communism (Stephen G. Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship," *Diplomatic History* 17 (Winter 1993), 112-13; Thomas M. Leonard, "Nationalism or Communism? The Truman Administration and Guatemala 1945-1952," *Journal of Third World Studies* 7 (Spring 1990), 169-91. ). Richard Immerman suggests that this is exactly what happened in the case of Guatemala. Nationalist policies were seen as Communist ones and therefore triggered the American intervention. But the problem is that Arbenz was no nationalist at that moment. He was trying to make a land reform that would help the masses and that was directed against foreign investors as much as against local landlords, therefore the nationalist discourse in the case of Arbenz does not work, at least in my view. The nationalist discourse works in the case of Alevaro's new labor code, that was directed more towards the foreign investors that were treating the Guatemalans as almost slaves, than towards the Guatemalan large companies.

A fourth possible theory to be thrown in the game would be a re-interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, in which the US sees a foreign ideology (foreign, as in, inspired by sources outside of the Western Hemisphere), Communism, developing in its sphere of influence, in a country led by a Government that would take measures that affect US interests as well as that could prove to be an example for the rest of the region. Basically, the US sees Guatemalans doing something they disagree with and they intervene. And in the words of Secretary of State, Olney "Today [1895] the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition" (quoted in Henry James, p.109). The same belief seemed to have existed in 1954, too. I see this case as a combination of the international policeman syndrome of the US in the Western Hemisphere, that is also interested in defending its interests there, combined with the great fear that the US had towards Communism. Maybe Guatemala would have turned Red in 10 or 15 years. Maybe. But the possibility of this happening combined with nationalism that was seen as a path to Communism and that in the same time hit into an American company's interests and combined with the fact that Guatemala could become a model, and in the same time a leader of the Latin America countries, hurting even more other American companies and strategic interests in the region, convinced the US to make an example out of Guatemala of what happens in its sphere of influence with those who disregard its opinion.

I would say that the theory that triggered the intervention was 20<sup>th</sup> century realism in the shape of the fear of Soviet Communism intruding in the Western Hemisphere. But 19<sup>th</sup> century realism in the shape of the Monroe Doctrine, revisionism in the shape of the economic interests and mistaking nationalist policies for Communist policies all had a role in shaping the policy for an intervention. However we have to admit that even though there is more to this intervention than simple 20<sup>th</sup> century realism, if it were not for the US's belief of a Communist threat to the US (even though that threat we proved it not be real) would have probably not intervened. Even the lobbyists of UFC realized that they have to frame their arguments in this sense!

There are still questions left unanswered and the case deserves further theoretical analysis, but there are still many documents not available and especially the documents of the United Fruit Company. However I hope that I managed to shed some light on the theories behind the US intervention and to state what is my view on this case.

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